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This paper focuses on the history of financialised management and its connections to shareholder 
value which is often viewed as undermining patient strategies of investments. We argue that the rise 
of financialised management has in fact a long history that goes back to the conglomerate 
movement in 1960s America. As we show, the conglomerates pioneered the use of financial 
markets as a baseline for strategy, and the emphasis on financial transactions as an engine for 
growth. They developed key techniques - high leverage, share-price maximisation, accounting 
manipulation - that later came to be associated with managerial strategies of the shareholder value 
era. This legacy has important implications for how we think about patient capital. It challenges the 
idea that patient capital consists foremost in shielding non-financial companies from capital markets 
and highlights the central role of management too often neglected in these debates.  
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‘Modern capital markets rarely give the impression of valuing the long term; they delight in profits 




 Since the 2008 financial crisis, regulators, politicians and academics have talked up the 
potential of ‘patient capital’ to nurture a sustained economic recovery (Kay, 2011; Wehinger, 2011; 
Bailey and Godsall, 2013). Their interest in patience stems from an unease regarding the pressures 
for immediate returns placed by shareholders upon non-financial companies (NFCs). Many believe, 
like Haldane, that financial markets do not always value the long term and worry that exposure to 
the imperatives of financial markets contort NFC strategies and instil short-termist and speculative 
behaviour that undermine labour, productive investment and economic stability. 
 This paper challenges the idea that impatience initially emanated from financial markets. The 
familiar story of the financialisation of the firm (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Duménil and 
Lévy, 2004; Ho, 2009) lends too much weight to the capacity of shareholders to dictate managerial 
norms and often misunderstands the source of ‘impatient’ strategies of accumulation by interpreting 
them as the structural product of increasingly liberalised capital markets. By contrast, we argue that 
the rise of NFC impatience has a more distinct historical origin, which can be traced back to the 
specific managerial innovations of a group of NFCs: the 1960s conglomerates. As we will show, 
these firms pioneered strategies of corporate growth that relied foremost on capitalising on 
financial markets and set the foundations for a new form of management that profoundly shook the 
American corporate establishment.  
 Pointing to the links between financialisation and corporate strategy highlights the agency of 
managerial teams using financial markets as engines of corporate growth and empowerment. This is 
important for as Deeg and Hardie point out, the common emphasis on protecting NFC managers 
from volatile equity markets risks ‘pushing the analysis of what patient capital is too far in the 
direction of a focus on managerial autonomy from shareholders’ (2016, this issue). Tracing the 
pivotal role of managers in the financialisation of the firm leads us to emphasise the need to cast 
patient capital more explicitly as a social relation. For in an age of abundant credit, the issue of 
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patient capital cannot be, and was not initially, posed simply as a concern regarding lenders or 
impatient shareholders/owners. What managers did with their capital has often proven more 
significant. In fact, we argue that the problem of impatience stems more from the resources capital 
markets provide corporations, than it does from an actual ‘lack of patient capital’. 
 In making this argument, we focus on the early financialisation of the firm from the late 
1960s up to the mid 1980s by contrast to a literature that usually takes the late 1980s-1990s 
‘shareholder era’ as a baseline for discussions about short-termism and patient capital (Soener, 
2015; Van der Zwan, 2014). However, we do not provide here a ‘history’ of the financialisation of 
the firm. Rather this is an exercise in conceptualisation. It builds on a well-established history to 
make a case for re-thinking the problem of patient capital. By revisiting historical literatures that are 
too often neglected in debates on patient capital, we seek to re-align our understanding of the 
‘problem of impatience’ with established facts which, if taken into account, profoundly change how 
we conceptualise patient capital and the broader context of the financialisation of NFCs. In that 
respect, this is an exercise in theorisation, a practice of radical historicism aimed at re-calibrating 
our conceptual framework (Knafo, 2013). 
 We undertake this work of conceptualisation in four steps. First, we discuss the literature on 
patient capital with an emphasis on the early context of its emergence to outline what is distinctive 
about the way it casts the relationship between finance and production. As we show, this concept 
largely took form in the 1980s as part of a response of the corporate establishment to the challenges 
set by financialised managerial teams that leveraged their operations through financial markets to 
rapidly capture other firms. The result was a concept of patient capital that placed the emphasis on 
the time horizon of investors, who were seen to be complicit in this process, rather than the more 
traditional concerns with financial support or industrial leadership, which had animated previous 
discussions about the role of finance in production. The second section focuses on the origins of the 
financialisation of the firm to trace the corporate strategies that gave rise to the debate on patient 
capital in the 1980s. While much of the comparative political economy literature reads the problem 
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of short termism as a diffuse institutional or cultural problem, pointing to various factors which 
inflect the time horizon of managers and which are taken as representative of a broader structural 
context (Laverty, 1996, Jackson and Petraki, 2011), we view it as a socio historical problem with a 
distinct lineage that must be traced to grasp the specificity of its corporate practices and the politics 
to which it gave rise. As we argue, it was the development of a new style of management geared 
towards taking positions on financial markets in order to capitalise on them which marks the real 
breakthrough. Having emphasised the managerial origins of impatience, the third section looks at 
the ways in which financiers became involved in financialised management and the pivotal role of 
investment banks in pushing financialised management to a new level. Finally, the last section 
reassesses the role of shareholders in this transformation. We argue that the early financialisation of 
NFCs suggests that it was shareholders who were later brought into line with this new type of 
financialised management, rather than the other way round. This will lead us to conclude that the 
problem of impatience is fundamentally a managerial problem which is connected to the 
opportunities financial markets provide for corporate strategy.  
 
 
1. The origins of patient capital  
 
The term ‘patient capital’ was barely used until it found political salience in 1980s America. 
When it first emerged patient capital referred to a much broader set of issues than NFC exposure to 
financial markets. It was first debated in 1983 when Democrat congressman Stan Lundine 
sponsored the creation of a National Industrial Development Bank. The bank, he said, would reward 
‘an industry that takes high risks and invests in productive capacity’ with ‘capital on better terms - 
so called “patient capital”’ (1983, p. 20). At the time, policymakers and industrialists in America 
were especially worried about international competition from Japan and there was interest in 
reviving the New Deal idea of a national development bank. Introducing his proposed legislation, 
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Lundine wrote: ‘In today’s context we are simply not able to generate the kind of “patient capital” 
needed to foster innovative, new, and emerging enterprises’ (ibid.). This concern was a continuation 
of Lundine’s interest in the institutions of trust-based capitalism. Before entering Congress Lundine 
had found recognition as a progressive Mayor of Jamestown, New York, trying to develop German-
style labour/management councils. He hoped that through a national development bank, financiers 
would take responsibility to ‘lead’ industry and finance the upscaling of America’s industrial base 
with the support of the state if necessary.  
That same year John Zysman published Government, Markets and Growth which became 
the touchstone for much of the academic work on comparative finance (1983). He was originally 
interested in the possibilities for building state capacity for exerting ‘industrial leadership’: the 
ability to ‘consciously influence and guide the pattern of investment, competition, and exchange 
between sectors or the industrial organization of particular industries’ (Zysman, 1977, p. 848). It 
was clear to Zysman that power was the issue at stake when it came to patient investment. More 
than simply lending money on a long-term horizon, Zysman was concerned with disciplining 
corporate management into adopting such strategies. This was a task he felt American market 
finance was ill equipped to carry out, not because it would expose NFCs to an irresistible volatility, 
but because the ‘decentralised financial system, with a strong securities market, contributed to a 
concentration of power and decision making in the corporation itself’ (Zysman, 1983, p. 
269). Focussing on the state and the necessity of leadership, Zysman argued that the lack of patient 
capital meant that America was missing an agent capable of forcing NFCs into the kind of long-
term strategies that would allow them to compete globally.  
But 1983 was also a big turning point for corporate governance with the beginning of what 
Martin Lipton, the famous corporate lawyer, would later describe derogatively’ as a wave of ‘bust 
up takeovers’ (Bruck, 1989: 209). Fuelled by the explosion of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) from that 
year onwards, the mid 1980s would witness the arrival of new ‘takeover entrepreneurs’ who rocked 
corporate America. It was an assault that rapidly altered the significance of the term patient capital 
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away from that found in the interventions of Lundine and Zysman. As the corporate establishment 
mobilised to lobby for legislation restricting takeovers, the business press took hold of the idea that 
patient capital was needed to meet the competitive pressures of Japan but quickly assigned new 
political valences to it, bringing it close to what we now associate with the term.  
The concern with disciplining management was quickly displaced in favour of an emphasis 
on the importance of investor support as financial markets were now identified as driving 
impatience. In this context, patience no longer meant coordinated competition and industrial 
leadership, as in the classic discussions of industrialisation (Gerschenkron, 1962) which had 
informed the work of Zysman. It became increasingly a matter of protecting the industrial base 
from rapacious investors cashing in on the hard-earned assets of corporations. As corporate 
managers were simply taken by the speed with which the raiders were moving, a premium was 
placed on time as they struggled to find ways to slow down and temper volatile investors caught in 
the movement. Donald Frey, a former Ford executive, thus wrote in Fortune magazine in 1986 that 
the US ‘needed patient investors’ to compete with the MITI-system Japanese car manufacturers. It 
was a similar point that Elmer Johnson, a former manager at General Motors, articulated in the 
pages of the Harvard Business Review pointing to the emergence of professional investors who 
mobilised with devastating consequences through the LBO boom and made financial market 
imperatives articulated through the threat of ‘exit’ too powerful and too blunt. As a result ‘managers 
ha[d] little choice but to sub-ordinate long-term goals to an all-out effort to report record earnings 
for each new quarter and adopt effective antitakeover measures: poison pills, ingenious charter 
provisions, and leveraging the balance sheet’ (Johnson 1990, p. 52). While the business press thus 
argued that ‘finance’ did have in fact the ‘financial power’ which Zysman had said was missing, it 
was no portent for industrial leadership. From this perspective, it had become a destructive force 
imposing its own short term agenda.  
Concerns with short termism have since been repeatedly employed to articulate managerial 
interests in relation to shareholders. Regulators and the press have generally followed this script. As 
7 
Roe points out, ‘over the years, the chairs of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Congress, 
business analysts, and the business media have regularly excoriated trading markets as perniciously 
shortening corporate time horizons’ and used this critique to justify ‘corporate law rules insulating 
boards from markets’ (2013, p. 979). This has led to a sustained campaign to remind institutional 
funds in particular of the need for them to commit to long term investments (Aspen Institute, 2009).  
Despite its political saliency, however, the term patient capital did not really enter the 
academic lexicon until the 1990s, and flourished only after the 2008 financial crisis. By that point, 
the framing of the question of patient capital had been largely etched along the lines set by the 
business press. It was a narrative which continued to place the blame primarily on shareholders for 
setting the terms of management, even if managers were also criticised for giving in too easily to 
these imperatives in order to maximise their own personal rewards (Aspara et al. 2014). As Jackson 
and Petraki note, underpinning this view was the assumption that impatience was counterproductive 
from the perspective of the firm (2011, p. 201), with shareholders and managers seen to be 
depleting the resources of corporations. This explains why the literature was prone to emphasise 
rent seeking behaviour, rather than corporate strategy. It was a perverse outcome that scholars were 
often tempted to pin down on structural constraints set by the liberalisation of capital markets. As a 
result, many came to equate the erosion of patience with growing market imperatives, or more 
specifically with the exposure of corporations to capital markets (Horn, 2011, p. 39).  
It is our contention that this reading does not square well with the history of American 
corporate governance. It is widely recognised that the development of increasingly liquid capital 
markets in the 1920s and 1960s empowered managers in the US, rather than undermined them. The 
ability of corporations to raise large levels of debts and the new channels opened for segments of 
the economy previously barred from capital markets (e.g. with junk bonds) suggest that market 
finance does not necessarily constrain management but also provides new opportunities. In other 
words, it does not impact management in any linear or structural way. For this reason, we move 
away from a structural account that focuses on the pressures of capital markets and turn to the 
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agency of NFC managers to provide a different perspective on the problem of impatience.  
 
2. The rise of financialised management  
 
 In the Transformation of Corporate Control, Neil Fligstein (1990) makes a strong case for 
examining the early roots of the financialisation of NFCs in the late 1950s and 1960s. Of particular 
importance were the so-called conglomerates, which emerged during this period. The term refers to 
an assortment of firms mostly built by outsiders with little previous corporate experience and 
limited ties to the corporate establishment (Sobel, 1984). Their rise took place as part of a broader 
movement of American corporations towards diversification, but what marked them out was the 
way in which they pursued diversification through financial means. Its leading pioneers, firms such 
as ITT, LTV, Litton and Gulf & Western, managed to grow at a very rapid pace on the basis of 
sustained acquisitions and financial dealings (Berg, 1969, p. 113). As Fligstein points out, many of 
the practices of corporate reorganisation which later became associated with financialisation 
(aggressive mergers, divestitures, LBOs, leveraging, stock repurchasing) were developed and 
perfected during this period as these firms innovated in order to sustain and expand their operations 
(Fligstein and Markovitz, 1993, p. 193).  
While Fligstein flags the pioneering role of the conglomerates, however, he conceptualises 
their activities through the lens of his financial concept of control, an underspecified notion which 
characterises this shift to finance in very general terms as a move towards a practice of management 
based on financial considerations and expertise. According to this view, the corporation was re-
conceptualised as a portfolio of assets with corporate managers willing to buy and sell their way in 
and out of product lines depending on their respective performance. But this view leads Fligstein to 
emphasise operational matters rather than the forays on capital markets which are mostly treated as 
incidental to portfolio management. It is no coincidence then if he barely discusses capital markets 
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in his analysis of the financial concept of control and ventures only few lines about the financial 
expedients of conglomerates (Fligstein, 1990, pp. 226-258).  
By contrast, we propose the notion of financialised management to mark out the way 
conglomerates pioneered strategies predicated on systematically capitalising on financial markets. 
What marked out financialised management was not simply the outlook of managers imposing a 
financial bottom line on the multidivisional firm, but a focus on using capital markets as engines of 
corporate growth. The strategic orientation of conglomerates became increasingly focused on 
generating profits through financial transactions, rather than improved operational management 
(Hyman, 2012, p. 198). The most financialised conglomerates succeeded for a while in feeding off a 
virtuous cycle by turning their performances on financial markets (e.g. high share prices) into 
tangible resources they could use to take new positions on these markets. As they became more 
active on capital markets in the process of conducting mergers, they increasingly used those 
markets as means for empowerment. Having come more or less ‘out of nowhere’ as Sobel points 
out, they compensated for their limitations by systematically tapping financial market. This is why, 
contra Fligstein who insists on the continuity between the conglomerates and the rest of the 
corporate establishment, we emphasise their contrasting practices. As Goolrick notes, many 
commented at the time on the threat these conglomerates represented for establishment-type 
companies (1978, pp. 78-79). As it would later be the case, this crystallised a vital political fault 
line which played a central role in the financialisation of the firm. 
The shift to financialised management comprised a series of transformations that would 
have a lasting impact on the corporate landscape:  
 
a) Acquisitions: Acquisitions were the pivotal component of financialised management. Some of 
the conglomerates joined the ranks of the biggest industrial concerns in America through such 
acquisitions. Most of the big conglomerates made each more than fifty acquisitions in the decade 
leading up to 1968 (Berg, 1969, p. 113); acquisitions which were usually made more with an eye to 
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financial markets than their productive synergies. Conglomerates did not have a particularly good 
track record in terms of production or entrepreneurial acumen in creating synergies among the 
various firms and divisions they owned. Rather they presented themselves as risk managers who 
were more efficient than traditional corporations because of their focus on investing capital 
‘wherever it worked most efficiently’ (Hyman, 2012, p. 199). According to Norman Berg’s 
estimates, their management structures were often very thin, amounting at times to about a tenth of 
the managerial structures of more established firms of the same size (Berg, 1969, p. 114). Some 
conglomerators saw themselves as ‘managers of managers’ and most were focused on finding ways 
to motivate managers of their divisions, sometimes through the issue of stock options. They were 
known for their limited commitment to Research and Development and their casual approach to 
organisational matters, at least from the perspective of creating effective internal synergies. In short, 
their success was usually predicated more on financial dealings than internal operations.  
Their acquisitions were usually aimed at increasing the cash inflow, often at the cost of 
long-term liabilities. In this respect, financialised management should not be conflated with the 
portfolio approach, commonly associated with the corporate world of the 1970s and often used as 
baseline for thinking about the early financialisation of the firm (see Zorn et al, 2004). Portfolio 
management was born out of the strategic revolution in management consulting that occurred in the 
1960s and which focused on the performance of divisions which were here treated as assets. While 
the focus was set on the financial bottom line, the key vectors to determine the potential value of a 
firm’s assets (or divisions) were defined in terms of economies of scale and market shares (Kiechel 
III, 2010). By contrast, financialised management treated assets in financial terms based on market 
value (not simply according to financial indicators concerned with the performance of these 
divisions). These assets were to be sold or restructured so as to produce value in the form of better 
share prices or increased cash flow. The objective was often the capture of assets through the stock 
market (cash reserves, commodity inventories for example in oil, or divisions/subsidiaries to be 
sold) rather than operational considerations. For example, conglomerates became interested in 
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insurance companies (and banks) towards the last years of the 1960s so as to get their hands on 
liquidities they could re-invest to finance their other operations, not because insurance was an up 
and coming product line (Brooks, 1973).  
Their ability to capitalise on stock markets was often vital to the conglomerates’ rapid 
growth as they parlayed mergers into rising share prices to further tap financial markets for capital. 
This explains that already in the 1960s, conglomerates put much effort into appearing attractive to 
shareholders long before the turn to shareholder value in the 1980s. One of the most successful in 
this respect was Litton industry. Its manager, Charles Thornton, pursued the acquisition of high 
profile firms in new technology sectors (though he himself did little to foster R&D) (Sobel, 1984). 
These enabled him to build a plausible rational for diversified acquisitions which would sit well 
with Wall Street. Thornton’s ability to play up to Wall Street through projecting promising 
technologies meant that he was able to maintain a high share price even when Litton ventured 
beyond electronics in the late 1950s, and began to purchase bigger but often struggling firms that it 
failed to prop up. Litton’s results, in terms of earnings, were increasingly disappointing but this did 
not undermine its ability to further tap financial markets. It was thus able to sustain the pace of 
acquisitions through the 1960s partly through the momentum of the stock market. 
This focus on acquisitions helps explain why the conglomerates came to dominate the wave 
of takeovers in the late 1960s, accounting for about 80% of mergers according to the Federal Trade 
Commission board (in Gaughan, 2011, p. 44). Firms such as ITT and Gulf and Western captured 
more than twenty firms each in 1968 alone (Sobel, 1984, p. 118). Gulf Western went, in fact, a step 
further as it repeatedly profited from failed acquisitions when the rise in the price of the shares it 
targeted allowed the firm to sell back a minority position initially acquired at a lower price for great 
profits. A 'failed' bid for the much larger Sinclair Oil in 1968, for example, netted a $24.2 million 
profit (Sobel, 1984: 119). It was the type of practice which would contribute to the antagonism 
directed against the conglomerates. 
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b) Financialised restructuring: The idea that the nominal value of a company was often lower 
than the potential value of its components was central to much of the restructuring conducted under 
financialised management. Divestments of divisions and subsidiaries became a key means for 
financing further deals, with conglomerates often being reorganised with an eye to further capitalise 
on financial markets. This could mean pursuing policies that would be well-received on the stock 
market, but also strategies to multiply the channels by which one could tap financial markets. The 
use of subsidiaries which could issue their own shares or debt was particularly important in this 
respect as it would also be in the 1980s (Prechel 1997; Kreier 2005, p. 8).  
Perhaps the most spectacular case of a financialised conglomerate was LTV, which 
managed to vault from the 204th to the 14th largest industrial concern in the US between 1965 and 
1969 purely on the back of its ruthless deal-making (Sobel, 1984, p. 78). Its manager, James Ling, 
became renowned for his ability to use the momentum imparted by capital markets in order to 
capture firms. Ling was a pioneer in using debt-financed acquisitions that foreshadowed LBOs, and 
share buybacks to bolster the position of LTV on financial markets. For Ling, going public by 
creating new subsidiaries became a means not only to raise money but also a strategy for making 
his collection of assets visible on capital markets so as to create enthusiasm and find new ways to 
capitalise on financial markets. He preyed particularly on complex multidivisional firms which 
offered great opportunities for selling assets or reorganising them so as to increase leverage and 
exposure on financial markets (Sobel, 1984, p. 93).  
 
c) Leveraging: This financialised management came to be marked by the extent to which 
conglomerates became leveraged. For while their success may have hinged on their continued 
ability to capitalise on the stock market, it was the muscle provided by debt financing which would 
be vital to their success. Indeed, the ability to avoid diluting Earning per Shares (EPS) and 
corporate control meant that considerable resources went into stock repurchases or creative forms of 
debt/equity hybrids (Greiman, 1970, p. 712). The result was a strong reliance on bonds with 
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warrants attached to them which would provide the option for investors to potentially benefit from 
rising share price but without unduly diluting EPS by limiting the initial issue of shares. As it would 
regularly be the case during the shareholder era of the 1990s, activities in the market for corporate 
control may have fuelled a spectacular growth of the stock market, but the striking feature of 
corporate finance was the heavy reliance on debt. Hence, during the height of the conglomerate era 
(1965-1970), the overall corporate debt to equity ratio grew from 0.48 to 0.72 (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan, 1997, p. 17). Financialised conglomerates thus learned to live with great debt ratios as 
financial considerations to do with balancing out cash flows took a primacy over other operational 
matters. 
Particularly important to this era was the emergence of the cash tender offer, by which a 
willing acquirer would make a public offer to buy shares with cash. It was a more decisive way to 
gain control than past strategies, which revolved around proxy fights or share swaps, but they 
required much more capital (Armour and Cheffins, 2014). By 1965, 70 per cent of all bids were 
made through cash tenders (Baskin & Miranti, 1997, p. 286) and managing such a feat required 
growing capacities to raise money in the form of debt. The ability to leverage was not only reflected 
by the rapid increases in the size of the target for acquisitions, but more importantly by the fact that 
it became common to see smaller firms capture larger targets, something almost unheard of in 
earlier waves of mergers and acquisitions (Gaughan, 2011, p. 44) and a direct reason again for why 
financialised management was perceived as a direct threat to the corporate establishment. 
 
d) Accounting manipulations: As the gains from financial dealings became increasingly attractive, 
financial considerations took a life of their own with executives prioritising them over more 
traditional concerns with productivity and organisational synergies (Zorn, 2004). In doing so, rapid 
growth became hard-wired into financial operations, which meant that financialised management 
required the continual development of new capacities for capitalising on financial markets, even if 
these proved difficult to sustain, as was often the case. This led to the desperate efforts by 
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conglomerate managers to continue riding speculative waves on financial markets, which often 
generated distinct imperatives of their own. Executives often felt compelled to focus increasingly 
on financial dealings, simply to maintain the thrust imparted by their financial practices of 
management. Acquisitions grew dramatically in size and frequency. As expectations on financial 
markets were set and financial commitments made, especially in the form of growing debt burdens, 
executives had little choice but to further the process of financialisation and seek new ways to 
capitalise further on capital markets. 
This may help explain why financialised management seemed so often to entail accounting 
manipulations. Systematic manipulations were a recurrent theme in the late 1960s, much as they 
would be later in the 1990s. This was not simply a symptom of corporate greed but was tied to the 
changing nature of managerial strategies. For navigating financial markets came to depend 
increasingly on the ways in which a firm could represent itself on capital markets. The 
conglomerates placed great emphasis on wooing shareholders and pushing up share values through 
manipulating figures such as EPS. In doing so, conglomerates often looked for firms with lower 
price-to-earnings ratios, so that the very act of combining with these firms would increase their 
EPS. Teledyne, for example, was repeatedly able to post annual increases in EPS of 90%, solely 
through mergers that gave the impression of efficient management, without actually making 
concrete changes to the actual operations of the divisions (Madrick, 1987, p. 64). To sustain this 
momentum, conglomerates also relied heavily on the accounting method of pooling, rather than 
what was seen by regulators as the more logical purchasing method. This method inflated earnings 
by registering only the cost of a merger in the form of the market value of the assets of a firm, 
which was often lower than the actual price paid for when initially acquired (Grieman, 1970). As a 
result, once more, earnings were systematically inflated in ways which did not reflect the financial 
commitments made. But this also involved exploiting new opportunities that were offered by the 
process of acquisition itself either for manipulating accounting through write-offs and deferred 
costs or exploiting tax reductions and loopholes (Briloff, 1970).  
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These four features would become characteristic of a new form of management that 
profoundly rocked the corporate establishment. That something radically new was afoot, was 
clearly appreciated by regulators who saw these activities as significant threat and their concerns 
prefigured those about patient capital which took form a decade later. Regulators, often supported 
by key figures of the financial and corporate establishment, bemoaned what they saw as a strategy 
of smoke and mirrors that was designed to quickly cash in through financial dealings at the expense 
of proper investments in real growth (Hyman, 2012: 201). The Federal Trade Commission and the 
SEC in the late 1960s became antagonistic to what they saw as the conglomerates’ overemphasis on 
financial indicators as the baseline to assess return on investment, and the way conglomerates 
systematically relied on financial markets to leverage their corporate activities. This view was 
echoed by a congressional subcommittee which concluded, in its 1970 report on the biggest 
conglomerates (LTV, G&W, ITT, Litton, and National General), that ‘financial considerations and 
not productivity goals were dominant motivating forces in the postwar merger movement’ (in Raw, 
1977, p. 225). This accounts for why Nixon’s administration, seen to be close to the corporate 
establishment, would in fact seek to clamp down on the practices of conglomerates. 
 Although the history of the conglomerates has been well-established and their financial 
orientation partly recognised, they continue to be mostly ignored in discussions of financialisation 
of the corporations. The literature on shareholder value or on short-termism never mentions these 
conglomerates, nor do these firms register in debates about patient capital. The reason is largely that 
the collapse of financial markets in the early 1970s, and the downturn of the stock market that 
began in 1969, proved disastrous for the conglomerates and their style of management. It took away 
the very motor that propelled them, and thus led to their decline. Yet this counterargument fails to 
recognise the important connections developed between the conglomerates and the financial world. 
These would play a vital role in carrying over the innovations of the conglomerates and pushing 




3. Wall Street and financialised management 
 
Instead of focusing on the agency of conglomerates, the literature has usually interpreted, if 
not normalised, the rise of financialised norms of management as a direct consequence of the 
economic and structural crisis of the 1970s. A problem, however, for those who think that capital 
simply took the high road of finance in response to the difficulties of the 1970s, is that this crisis 
was not only one of American industry; it was also one for financialised management. As the 
conglomerates had shown, the financialisation of the firm required a greater level of institutional 
support to be viable. It was one that Wall Street would ultimately provide, but there was nothing 
straightforward about this. As we argue here, financialised management posed significant problems 
for finance, forcing banks to innovate and transform often at the cost of great internal conflicts. It 
was the agency of specific banks that would finally make it possible for finance to chime in with 
financialised management.  
 Pivotal here were the investment banks which served as the crucial linchpin for financialised 
management after the decline of the conglomerates. These banks first got involved with 
financialised management through their role in the conglomerate-dominated expansion of the 
takeover market in the mid 1960s. It is important to point out that before the 1970s, investment 
banks did not have departments specialised in mergers and acquisitions, a service they initially saw 
as secondary to their main business of underwriting (Chandler, 1990, p. 624). But this changed as 
numerous banks became involved with conglomerates in the 1960s, helping them identify targets 
for acquisitions and working on the mechanics of takeovers (Sobel, 1984). Particularly important 
here were banks like Lazard Frères, where the influential Felix Rohatyn was instrumental to the 
operations of Henry Geneen’s ITT, the biggest of the conglomerates. Lehman Brothers played a 
significant role financing Litton and LTV, while Chase Manhattan, a commercial bank, had close 
ties to Gulf Western (Sobel, 1984).  
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It was not inevitable, however, that some investment banks converged with the practices of 
financialised management. To begin with, the techniques they subsequently developed did not come 
from their own initiatives but rather were driven initially by the managerial demands of the 
conglomerates (Chernow, 1990). There was great reluctance at first within the banking community 
to become involved in these activities. Just as the corporate establishment they served, the 
underwriting experts who dominated investment banks were opposed to the activities of the 
conglomerates. This was because providing information about potential targets and supporting the 
wave of takeovers threatened to undermine the trust that underwriters had built with corporations, 
something the underwriters saw as vital for securing future contracts.  
Conflicts within banks raged for more than a decade with most investment banks only 
letting go of their main advisory role in the late 1970s and early 1980s once blue chip corporations, 
their traditional clients, began to systematically take the route of disintermediation (Chernow, 
1990). By that point, the M&A teams were increasingly mainstreaming mergers and acquisitions, as 
big corporations sought to take advantages of the opportunities for profitable acquisitions. Inflation 
was then increasing the value of the assets owned by firms while a stagnant stock market was 
making these firms increasingly cheap to purchase. In this context, investment banks became 
increasingly proactive in proposing mergers and gradually refined the mechanics of takeovers, 
which facilitated hostile ones (Cole, 2008). But in the process they moved away from the template 
set by the conglomerates and came closer to the classic portfolio approach to management. During 
the 1970s, it was dominant firms that grew through mergers and their acquisitions were financed 
from large cash reserves with an eye very much on growth, rather than divestment (Madrick, 1987). 
This meant that there was less need to align management on financial markets, because these 
dominant firms were not relying on these markets to leverage their activities in the way that the 
conglomerates had done before.  
 It was one investment bank which actually pushed the conglomerate legacy of financialised 
management into the 1980s: Drexel Burnham and Lambert. It became renowned for its use of 
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below investment grade bonds, or ‘junk bonds’, which it exploited to finance corporate raiders and 
LBO firms. This set the foundations for a series of acquisitions in the 1980s as part of a broader 
strategy that owed much to the practices of conglomerates, although with shorter horizons and more 
drastic methods. Firms were targeted on the basis of their low value on markets with an eye to 
rapidly restructuring them and increasing their value. In the process, there was great leveraging, 
usually paid for by divesting assets of the corporations targeted or saddling the latter with the debt 
incurred in the takeover. 
 Michael Milken was the force behind Drexel Burnham Lambert and the architect of the 
development of a secondary market for junk bonds in the 1970s. It is very significant, even if rarely 
mentioned, that he succeeded partly through his close collaboration with conglomerators such as 
Meshulam Riklis, Saul Steinberg and Carl Lindner, who had been important players in the 1960s. 
Milken’s portfolio of junk bonds was in fact largely made of debts previously issued by these 
conglomerates (Bruck, 1989, p. 35). By the 1970s, conglomerators were struggling to support the 
value and credibility of their bonds because of a lack of demand and trust. As Benjamin Stern 
documents, these conglomerators were able through their association with Milken to re-establish a 
secondary market for their paper, often initially by buying each others bonds, in order to prop up 
and legitimate their respective issues (Stern, 1992, p. 48). The workings of this inner circle would 
become a defining feature of Milken’s operations that enabled a rapid placement for securities by 
using his collaborators to effectively buy one another’s bonds (Zey, 1993). With time, the network 
grew, providing broader scope for the circulation of this paper and making it increasingly possible 
to finance vast operations. As Milken’s practices matured and his network for placement of junk 
bonds consolidated, he was able to issue himself junk bonds to stunning effects, and took the 
corporate world by storm through his ability to raise large sums rapidly, a key advantage for 
capturing firms (Kaufman and Englander, 1993). Considering his long association with 
conglomerators, it is no surprise that Milken used his financial machinery to support a rapidly 
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growing network of corporate raiders who would use this to further deploy the strategies of 
financialised management. 
 At the forefront of this revolution were the LBO firms which refined this peculiar fusion of 
managerial practice and financial strategic considerations. The founding partners of KKR, the 
premier LBO firm, cut their teeth organising LBOs partly as a service to managers and devoted a 
significant part of their early work to help conglomerates divest themselves of assets (Bartlett, 
1991, p. 45). Increasingly, practices of LBO firms such as KKR would come to re-deploy the 
practices of financialised conglomerates in leveraging themselves to buy up undervalued firms 
whose assets could be restructured to improve their value, and sold off. In the new financial context, 
taking these assets private in the form of an LBO often proved the best way to carry out this type of 
financialised management. For the centrifugal forces of financialisation made it increasingly 
difficult to accumulate assets because of the difficulty of translating a broad range of assets into a 
nominal value sufficiently high to deter predators (Davis et al., 1994).  
The turning point for the take-off of the LBOs was 1983, a date we already singled out as 
pivotal to the discussion over patient capital. That year Milken decided to put his machinery to use 
for funding LBO takeovers. Having been worth $11 billion in the period going from 1977 to 1983, 
the value of LBO takeovers exploded to $233 billion between 1984 and 1989 (Stearns and Allan, 
1996, p. 706). This support of junk bond financing played most notably a vital role in pushing KKR 
to a new level, as reflected with their then unprecedented bid for Beatrice. More importantly, this 
financing propped a new wave of raiders closely tied to Milken who accentuated the logic of 
divestment of financialised management. This wave of corporate raiders essentially redeployed 
many of the ideas which had been developed by conglomerates. The great difference was the 
financial resources that were now available. Offering high interest rates made it easy to raise money 
but it also meant that raiders needed ruthless strategies to cash in on the acquisitions to cover for the 
costs. As the competitive edge of financialised management was pushed further with securitisation, 
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the initiative was given to those who focused on divestments and cashing in, rather than those piling 
up assets. 
 In this way, the innovations of investment banks made corporate contests more ruthless and 
intensified the problem of impatience. It is thus no coincidence if the term of patient capital would 
take on its new features during the mid-1980s precisely when financialised management was 
unleashed on a new level. Already on the eve of the 1970s, government officials and most of the 
corporate establishment had been appalled with the short term horizons of conglomerates that paid 
no respect to tradition or broader sets of stakeholders. But by 1985, managers and politicians were 
shocked at the sight of small firms and raiders capturing great pillars of corporate America and 
stripping their assets. The concern led policymakers to attempt to pass new laws aimed at restricting 
the market for corporate control. By the spring of 1985, more than 30 regulations were tabled in 
Congress to stop the wave of takeovers (Bruck, 1989: 209) and the courts were repeatedly called-
upon to protect corporations from being ransacked for their assets. There was real anxiety within 
the corporate establishment at the sight of a wave of takeovers dilapidating the industrial landscape. 
In this context, shareholder value took form as the main response of the corporate establishment to 
the threat posed by financialised management. 
 
 
4- Shareholder value and the financial turn of established corporations  
 
As we have argued, the main agents of the financialisation of the firm were managerial 
teams which developed tools to systematically capitalise on financial markets and the specific 
investment banks which came to support them. They shaped the early financialisation of the firm 
through their innovations. Integral to our argument is the claim that there is, by contrast, little 
historical evidence to trace back such changes to the agency of shareholders. Shareholder activism 
generally emerged quite late in the process of the financialisation of the firm and when it did, it was 
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not aimed at raising corporate performance per se, but rather to ‘get in on the action’ and benefit 
from the managerial contests which were multiplying around acquisitions.  
However, one may still assume that the conglomerates, and Milken’s financial raiders, 
played into the hands of shareholders and, more generally, finance. It is true that the attempts by 
financialised managerial teams to enrol shareholders in the context of corporate contests over 
acquisitions certainly helped politicise corporate governance, and increase the visibility of 
shareholder concerns. Yet shareholders did not have it their way. Studies of shareholder activism 
show that shareholders have had, at best, mixed results in terms of increasing value delivered to 
investors (Froud et al., 2006) and that upholding ‘shareholder value’ has often resulted in 
disappointing outcomes for investors (O’Sullivan, 2000; Gillan and Starks, 2007). This does not 
mean that managers simply dictated terms for financialised management, but that their practices and 
strategies cannot be read directly off their surroundings. Instead, managers played a pivotal role in 
translating the opportunities and constraints of their environment into distinct practices of 
management, which can only be captured with a focus on their agency.  
Interestingly, there is a long history in the United States of managers talking up their 
commitment to shareholders. It precedes the so-called shareholder revolution, and is in no way 
correlated with acting in the interest of shareholders. This discourse, in fact, took form initially with 
the separation of managerialism from ownership in the 1920s which is usually seen as the source of 
the very problem that the shareholder revolution was meant to address. As Julia Ott’s (2011) shows, 
the discourse of managers serving shareholders was tied to the democratisation of shareholding and 
reflected an attempt to reassure small investors who were getting involved in the stock market. 
Wooing these small shareholders would be in turn a decisive reason behind the ability of corporate 
managers to gain autonomy from blockholder owners or the attempts of actual owners to raise 
money without losing control. The idea of serving shareholder interest became a central motif of 
corporate governance in the US and was modulated in various ways throughout the postwar era. 
Managers appealed to various strands of this ‘shareholder’ ideology, with shareholders being 
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already cajoled by managerial teams in the context of takeovers or managerial contests in the 1950s 
(Sobel, 1993, p. 15).  
This brings us back to the key political fault-line we have emphasised in this article. For the 
discourses and templates of shareholder value were not simply cultural artefacts that served to set 
new priorities in the context of rising market fundamentalism. They took form as more established 
corporations sought to come to terms with the thrust of financialised management. At stake was the 
question of what, from financialised management, could be translated into the practices of 
established corporations. Two of the main architects of shareholder value, Alfred Rappaport and 
Joel Stern, began fleshing out their ideas in the late 1960s and 1970s, initially on the back of a 
critique of conglomerates and their use of EPS, which they criticised their arbitrary manipulations 
rather than effective management. Both Stern and Rappaport were motivated to build a different 
baseline for organising a practice of management more attuned to capacities for capitalising on 
financial markets. While they framed their ideas around the notion of shareholder value, their 
concerns were managerial. Stern had been a management consultant since the late 1960s and 
worked to draw out the implications of the work of financial theorists such as Modigliani and Miller 
for corporate governance (Stern and Willets, 2014). Rappaport meanwhile fleshed his own 
conception of shareholder value initially as a means for managers to assess profitable mergers from 
a different analytical standpoint than the more common portfolio approach that dominated the 
corporate establishment (Rappaport, 1979). From the beginning, these early templates of 
shareholder value were conceived as tools of management, with references to shareholders being 
primarily rhetorical. Shareholder value was here a concept to measure performance on financial 
markets, not a norm for prioritising shareholders per se. This is why the architects of shareholder 
value distanced themselves from agency theory, at least in the form developed by Michael Jensen, 
since they rejected its initial assumption that there was an agency problem leading to a lack of 
managerial accountability (Stern and Willets, 2014; Rappaport 1989) 
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 This process of translation has been a difficult one which is still ongoing. In that respect, the 
legacy of financialised management is a complex one that cannot be adequately summarised here. 
We wish, however, to draw attention to the fact that financialised management along with growing 
capacities for placement of financial securities has profoundly impacted the rules of corporate 
competition. The problem does not stem simply from a new environment that is geared towards 
rewarding managers who maximise short-term earnings, but from the new challenges that are posed 
by a financialised economy in which the ability to capitalise on financial markets can often prove 
decisive in corporate contests, a fact strongly impressed on the European corporate establishment 
by the takeover of Mannesmann by Vodafone (Höpner and Jackson, 2006). Having witnessed the 
financial capacities built by the conglomerates, corporate raiders and LBO firms, it became 
impossible to ignore the new possibilities for capitalising on financial markets, especially when the 
compensation of managers itself could be so drastically improved (Krier, 2005). In the process, 
corporate success became increasingly associated with the ability of firms to position themselves on 
financial markets. This, of course, often meant the ability of managers to speak to shareholder 
interest. But as in the case of Litton and LTV, this did not necessarily mean serving them. That 
shareholders largely benefitted from managerial dealings may be clear, but we should not interpret 
this as being dictated by shareholders. If anything, it was the interests of shareholders that were 
aligned with those of financialised management, not the other way around.  
We thus come back to Zysman’s initial concern with ‘patience’ as a problem of power, one 
concerned with disciplining the decision-makers which are shaping the future of corporations: the 
managers. For in emphasising the challenges faced by managers through this process of 
financialisation and their agency in responding to them, we argue that short termism may be more 
deeply entrenched than sometimes believed. The problem is not simply one of containing 
managerial excesses or shielding managers from market pressures. It involves dealing with the very 





Conclusion: patient capital after shareholder value 
 
 This article has challenged the literature about patient capital for its tendency to exaggerate 
the agency of financiers versus that of managers. It argues that one should not simply focus on the 
sources of capital but analyse this in relation to how this capital is being used. In other words, 
patient capital has to be analysed explicitly as a social relation; one which involves managers and 
financiers. By tracing the lineages of financialised management back to the 1950s and 1960s, we 
have used history to highlight the agency of management in the rise of financialised management. 
As we argued, financialised conglomerates rode financial markets to spectacular successes in terms 
of fast corporate growth. By using financial markets as a baseline for strategy, they placed great 
emphasis on financial transactions as the engine for corporate growth. In doing so, they developed 
many of the key ideas which came to be later associated with managerial strategies during the era of 
shareholder value.   
 This historical perspective suggests that the turn of NFCs towards financialisation may be 
more profound and damaging than what is commonly recognised in the patient capital literature. In 
an age where capital can be mobilised with ease and on an astonishing scale (see the 2013 $49 
billion bond issue by Verizon), it is often dangerous for managers to focus mostly on improving 
productive efficiency when competitors are taking strong positions on financial markets from which 
they can launch takeovers. The financial muscle provided by securitisation has transformed the 
parameters of corporate competition. For it is not simply a pattern of re-distribution imposed by 
shareholders that is at stake, but the re-shaping of competitive incentives under financialisation. 
Contrary to the assumption that the problem for corporations is the lack of financial support for 
patient strategies, the problem may in fact have to do with there being too much financing available 
to corporations. This has made it more advantageous to pursue financialised strategies of growth 
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through capture (despite limited success in terms of profitability), rather than traditional strategies 
of investment. The challenge then is not simply to replace certain types of financiers with others in 
order to free managers from the concerns of shareholders. It may have more to do with limiting the 
possibilities for firms to capitalise on financial markets.  
This highlights a danger for the literature on patient capital which has been driven by a 
laudable intent to provide space for, and encourage, more long-term managerial strategies that serve 
a broader range of stakeholders too often neglected under the era of shareholder value. For in 
focusing on the sources of capital, those who champion patient capital may unwittingly serve the 
interests of management. The challenge we argue is not foremost to secure stable financial 
resources for management, but to address financialised management itself. In other words, the 






Armour, J. and Cheffins, B. (2014) ‘Origins of the Market for Corporate Control’, University of 
Illinois Law Review, pp. 1835-1866. 
 
Aspara, J., Panjuen, K., Tikkanen, H, and Tainio, R. (2014) ‘Explaining Corporate Short-Termism: 
Self-Reinforcing Processes and Biases among investors, the media and corporate managers’, Socio-
Economic Review, 12: 667–693 
 
Aspen Institute (2009) Overcoming Short-termism: A Call for a More Responsible Approach to 
Investment and Business Management, accessed at 
26 
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/overcome_short_state0909_0.p
df on April 24, 2016. 
 
Bailey J. and Godsall, J. (2013) ‘Short-termism: Insights from Business Leaders Findings from a 
Global Survey of Business Leaders’, commissioned by McKinsey & Company and CPP Investment 
Board, accessed at: http://www.shareholderforum.com/access/Library/20131226_McKinsey.pdf on 
February 11, 2016. 
 
Bartlett, S. (1991) The Money Machine: How KKR Manufactured Power & Profits, New York, 
Warner Books. 
 
Baskin, J. B. and Miranti, P. J. (1997) A History of Corporate Finance, New York, Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Berg, N. (1969) ‘What is Different About Conglomerate Management’, Harvard Business Review, 
47: 112-120. 
 
Briloff, A. (1970) ‘Accounting Practices and the Merger Movement’, Notre Dame Law Review, 45 
(4): 604-628. 
 
Brooks, J. (1973) The Go-Go Years, New York, Weybright and Talley. 
 
Bruck, C. (1989) The Predator's Ball: The Inside Story of Drexel Burnham and the Rise of Junk 
Bond Raiders, London, Penguin. 
 




Chernow, R. (1990) The House of Morgans: An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern 
Finance, New York, Touchstone. 
 
Cole, B. (2008) M&A Titans: The Pioneers who Shaped Wall Street’s Mergers and Acquisitions 
Industry, Hoboken (NJ), John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Davis. G, Diekmann, K. and Tinsley, C. (1994) ‘The Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm in 
the 1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational Form’, American Sociological Review, 
59 (4): 547-570. 
 
Deeg, R. and Hardie, H. (2016) ‘What is patient capital and who supplies it? ’, Socio-Economic 
Review, This issue. 
 
Duménil, G. and Lévy, D. (2004) Capital Resurgent: Roots of the Neoliberal Revolution, London, 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Fligstein, N. (1990) The Transformation of Corporate Control, London, Harvard University Press. 
 
Fligstein, N. and Markowitz, L. (1993) ‘Financial Reorganization of American Corporations in the 
1980s’, in Wilson, W. J. (ed.), Sociology and the Public Agenda, Newbury Park, CA, Sage, pp. 
185–206. 
 
Frey, D. (1986) ‘The US needs patient investors’, Fortune, 114, 125. 
 
28 
Froud, J., Johal, S., Leaver, A., and Williams, K. (2006) Financialization and Strategy: Narrative 
and Numbers, London, Routledge. 
 
Gaughan, P. (2011) Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Restructurings, John Wiley & Sons, 
Hoboken (NJ). 
 
Gerschenkron, A. (1962) Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Gillan, S. L., and Starks, L. T. (2007) ‘The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States’, 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 19 (1), pp. 55-73. 
 
Goolrick, R. (1978) Public Policy toward Corporate Growth: The ITT Merger Cases, London, 
Kennikat Press. 
  
Grieman, G. (1970) ‘Mergers’, Notre Dame Law Review, 45, pp. 698-745. 
 
Haldane, A. (2015) ‘Fast Finance and Slow Growth’, In Mazzucato, M. and Penna, C. (eds.), 
Mission-Oriented Finance for Innovation: New Ideas for Investment-Led Growth, Lanham, MD, 
Policy Network, pp. 13-20. 
 
Ho, K. (2009) Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall Street, London, Duke University Press. 
 
Höpner, M. and G. Jackson (2006) ‘Revisiting the Mannesmann Takeover: how Markets for 
Corporate Control Emerge’, European Management Review, 3(3), pp. 142-155.  
 
29 
Horn, L. (2011) ‘How did we end up here? The rise of shareholder value in EU corporate 
governance regulation’, In Vitols S. and Kluge, N. (eds.), The Sustainable Company: a new 
approach to corporate governance, European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), Brussels, pp. 39-58  
  
Hyman, L. (2012) ‘Rethinking the Postwar Corporation: Management, Monopolies, and Markets’, 
In Phillips-Fein, K. and Zelizer, J. (eds.), What's Good for Business: Business and Politics Since 
World War II, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 195-212. 
 
Jackson, G. and A. Petraki (2011) ‘How does corporate governance lead to short-termism?’, in 
Vitols S. and Kluge N. (eds) The Sustainable Company: a new approach to corporate governance, 
European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), Brussels, pp. 199-226. 
 
Johnson, E. (1990) ‘An Insider’s Call for Outside Direction’, Harvard Business Review, 68 (2), pp. 
46–56. 
 
Kaufman, A., and Englander, E. J. (1993) ‘Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. And the Restructuring 
of American Capitalism’, Business History Review, 67, pp. 52-97. 
 
Kay, J. (2012) ‘The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making’, 
accessed at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253454/bis-12-917-
kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf on January 21, 2016.  
 
Kiechel III, W. (2010) The Lords of Strategy: The Secret Intellectual History of the New Corporate 
World, Boston, Harvard Business Press. 
 
30 
Knafo, S. (2013) The Making of Modern Finance: Liberal Governance and the Gold Standard. 
New York, Routledge. 
 
Krier, D. (2005) Speculative Management: Stock Market Power and Corporate Change, Albany, 
State of New York University Press. 
 
Laverty K. (1996) ‘Economic “Short-Termism”: The Debate, the Unresolved Issues, and the 
Implications for Management Practice and Research’, Academic Management Review, 21 (3) 825-
860.  
 
Lazonick, W., and O’Sullivan, M. (1997) ‘Finance and Industrial Development. Part I: The United 
States and the United Kingdom’, Financial History Review, 4 (1), pp. 7-29. 
 
Lazonick, W., and O’Sullivan, M. (2000) ‘Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for 
Corporate Governance’, Economy and Society, 29 (1), pp. 13-35. 
 
Lundine, S. (1983) ‘Now Is the Time for a National Industrial Strategy’, Challenge, 26 (3), pp. 16–
21. 
 
Madrick J. (1987) Taking America: How we got from the First Hostile Takeover to Megamergers, 
Corporate raiding and Scandal, London, Bantam Books. 
 
O'sullivan, M. (2000) Contests for Corporate Control: Corporate Governance and Economic 
Performance in the United States and Germany, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Ott, J. (2011) When Wall Street met Main Street: The Quest for an Investors’ Democracy, London, 
31 
Harvard University Press.  
 
Prechel, H. (1997) ‘Corporate Transformation to the Multilayered Subsidiary Form: Changing 
Economic Conditions and State Business Policy’, Sociological Forum, 12 (3), pp. 405-439. 
 
Rappaport, A. (1979) ‘Strategic Analysis for more Profitable Acquisitions’, Harvard Business 
Review, 57 (4), pp. 99-110. 
 
Rappaport, A. (1989) ‘The Staying Power of the Public Corporation’, Harvard Business Review, 68 
(1), pp. 96-104. 
 
Raw, C. (1977) Slater Walker, London, Andre Deutsch Ltd. 
 
Roe, M. (2013) ‘Corporate Short-termism-In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom’, The Business 
Lawyer, 68 (4), pp. 977-1006. 
 
Sobel, R. (1984) The Rise and Fall of the Conglomerate Kings, Washington, Beardbooks. 
 
Sobel, R. (1993) Dangerous Dreamers: the Financial Innovators from Charles Merrill to Michael 
Milken, Washington D.C., Beard Books. 
 
Soener, M. (2015) ‘Why do Firms Financialize? Meso-Level Evidence from the US Apparel and 
Footwear Industry, 1991–2005’, Socio-Economic Review, 13 (3), pp. 549-573. 
 
Stern, B. (1992) License to Steal: The Untold Story of Michael Milken and the Conspiracy to Bilk 
the Nation, New York, Simon & Schuster. 
32 
 
Stern, J. and Willett, J. T. (2014) ‘A Look Back at the Beginnings of EVA and Value‐Based 
Management’, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 26 (2), pp. 39-46. 
 
Stearns, L. B. and Allan, K. (1996) ‘Economic Behavior in Institutional Environments: The 
Corporate Merger Wave of the 1980s’, American Sociological Review, 61 (4), pp. 699-718. 
 
Van der Zwan, N. (2014) ‘Making sense of financialisation’, Socio-Economic Review, 12 (1), pp. 
99-129. 
 
Wehinger, G (2011) ‘Fostering Long-term Investment and Economic Growth: Summary of a High-
Level OECD Financial Roundtable’, OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 1, pp. 9-29.  
 
Zey, M. (1993) Banking on fraud: Drexel, Junk Bonds, and Buyouts, New York, Aldine de Gruyter. 
 
Zorn, D. (2004) ‘Here a Chief, There a Chief: The Rise of the CFO in the American Firm’, 
American Sociological Review, 69: 345-364. 
 
Zorn, D., Dobbin, F., Dierkes, J. and Man-Shan, K. (2004) ‘Managing Investors: How Financial 
Markets Reshaped the American Firm’, In Knorr-Cetina, K. and Prada, A. (eds.), Sociology of 
Financial Markets, London, Oxford University Press, pp. 269-289. 
 
Zysman, J. (1983) Governments, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of 
Industrial Change, Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 
